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2 
Summary 21 
 22 
Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes 23 
prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study we investigated whether religious 24 
priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. 304 participants 25 
played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were 26 
subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes, or control 27 
primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of 28 
unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants – those who had previously donated 29 
to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially 30 
underpinning this effect. The first is a ‘supernatural watcher’ mechanism, whereby 31 
religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that 32 
not doing so will anger or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a 33 
‘behavioural priming’ mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms 34 
pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those 35 
norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals 36 
about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically 37 
inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their 38 
adherents. 39 
 40 
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4 
Introduction 43 
 44 
The LORD is a jealous God, filled with vengeance and wrath… (Nahum 1:2) 45 
 46 
Religion carries formidable epistemic, metabolic and material costs [1-3]. Religious 47 
believers must maintain and compartmentalize beliefs that are extravagantly at variance 48 
with intuitive conceptions of reality. Religious rituals, moreover, are often physically 49 
taxing and painful, and frequently require the sacrifice of precious resources. Given 50 
such costs, some evolutionary theorists argue that religion must provide, or in the 51 
ancestral past must have provided, countervailing adaptive benefits [e.g., 1-7; cf. 8-9]. 52 
Perhaps the most influential of such proposals is that religion is a cultural variant that 53 
confers a selective advantage at the group level by virtue of the fact that it secures and 54 
promotes cooperative behaviour within the group [6-7]. This proposal arguably solves 55 
not one but two thorny evolutionary puzzles: The puzzle of religion and the puzzle of 56 
human cooperation. 57 
 58 
The nature and extent of human cooperation is unique in the animal kingdom [10-11]. 59 
Human societies are based on large-scale cooperation between genetically unrelated 60 
individuals. Cooperation is frequent in non-repeated interactions, even when 61 
reputational gains are small or absent. Cooperation and other prosocial behaviours will 62 
in many situations be sustained by preferences for fairness, or by a cultural norm of 63 
fairness [10]. Such preferences are evidenced by the behaviour of participants in 64 
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5 
anonymous, one-shot economic games, many of who nominate fair outcomes even 65 
when such outcomes are disadvantageous with respect to their material self-interest 66 
[10,12]. Humans, moreover, reward others who behave fairly and impose sanctions on 67 
those who fail to do so [10].  68 
 69 
One potential means of implementing fairness norms is via culturally postulated 70 
supernatural agents [9], in particular “full-access strategic agents” such as omnipotent, 71 
omniscient, moralizing gods [8,13]. Individuals who believe that behavioural norms are 72 
policed by an all-knowing supernatural agent with the power and inclination to inflict 73 
terrible retribution for norm violations will have a strong incentive to comply with those 74 
norms. Some authors, therefore (e.g., 7,14-16], have suggested that belief in supernatural 75 
punishment confers a selective advantage by promoting prosocial behaviour. 76 
 77 
Recent evidence from studies employing priming paradigms is consistent with this 78 
proposal. In a seminal study, Shariff and Norenzayan [17] used a scrambled sentence 79 
task to prime religious concepts, and found that participants primed in this fashion gave 80 
significantly more money in a subsequent (anonymous, one-shot) dictator game than 81 
did control participants. Similar results have been found in other recent priming studies. 82 
For example, relative to control participants, participants primed with religious or 83 
supernatural concepts have been found to cheat less [18-19], to collect more charity 84 
pamphlets [20], and to be more likely to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma game [21]. 85 
 86 
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6 
Religious priming appears to promote prosocial behaviour – but does it also promote 87 
the costly punishment of unfair behaviour? In the present study we sought to 88 
investigate this issue. In order to minimise demand characteristics [see 22], we decided 89 
to present primes subliminally. Our research questions were threefold: 1) Would 90 
participants primed with the concepts of religion and/or punishment punish more in a 91 
punishment game? 2) Would such primes influence punishment of unfair behaviours 92 
only, or punishment of both unfair and fair behaviours? 3) Would any effects of religious 93 
primes be limited to participants with religious commitments? 94 
 95 
Methods 96 
 97 
Participants and General Procedure 98 
The sample comprised 304 participants (140 females, 164 males; Mean age ± SD = 21.9 99 
years ± 3.7), most of who were students at the University of Zürich or the Swiss Federal 100 
Institute of Technology in Zürich. The breakdown of religious affiliations broadly 101 
mirrored that of Zürich society in general1 and was as follows: approximately 30% 102 
Protestant, 28% Catholic and 42% other affiliations/no affiliation. Recruitment was 103 
conducted using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments [ORSEE; 104 
23]. 105 
 106 
                                                 
1 2009 census data: 35% Protestant, 29% Catholic and 36% other affiliations/no affiliation; see 
http://www.statistik.zh.ch/themenportal/themen/daten_detail.php?id=673. 
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7 
The experimental procedure was as follows. Participants were randomly assigned the 107 
role of either Player A or Player B and played a two-stage punishment game with a 108 
player of the opposite type. Between the two stages of the game participants underwent 109 
a subliminal priming episode, and after the completion of the second stage they 110 
undertook a systematic test of prime visibility. Finally, participants filled out two 111 
questionnaires – one to collect demographic information (age, gender etc.) and one to 112 
collect information about religious affiliation, beliefs and practices. Upon completion, 113 
participants were paid a show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs (CHF) plus their earnings from 114 
the experiment. 115 
 116 
Punishment Game 117 
We measured punishment using a two-player second party punishment game [24]. This 118 
game had a two-stage structure. In the first stage, Player A chose an allocation of 119 
proposed payoffs to herself and Player B. Allocations were presented in points (1 point 120 
= 0.28 CHF). Two options were presented on the computer screen for Player A to choose 121 
between: a fair option (150,150) and an unfair option (590,60). In each option the values 122 
on the left and right indicated the shares of Players A and B respectively. 123 
 124 
In the second stage of the game Player B was informed of the two options that were 125 
available to Player A in the first stage, but did not learn the specific choice that Player A 126 
made.  Instead, we used the ‘strategy method’ in order to maximize the amount of 127 
statistical data gathered: Player B was, for each option, given the opportunity to spend 128 
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8 
points out of her allocation share in order to reduce Player A’s payoff in that case - i.e., 129 
to punish Player A. In each case the choice was binding, provided that the relevant 130 
option was actually chosen by Player A. Previous work has shown that participants’ 131 
qualitative behavioural patterns are unaffected by the use of this method as opposed to 132 
the ‘direct-response’ method, in which Player B learns the specific choice made by 133 
Player A and then chooses a response [25-26]. Player B could spend a maximum of 50 134 
points (and minimum of 0) to punish Player A, i.e., Players B entered a number between 135 
0 and 50 for each of the two options. A 1:3 punishment ratio was employed, such that 136 
each point spent by Player B reduced the payoff of Player A by three points - provided 137 
that the relevant choice was actually made by Player A. Hence, if Player A chose the 138 
allocation (xA,xB) and Player B punished her with 0 <= p <= 50 points for that choice, 139 
Player A’s payoff was xA – 3p and Player B’s payoff was xB – p. 140 
 141 
Priming Episode and Visibility Check 142 
 143 
The priming episode followed the first stage of the punishment game. There were four 144 
between-subjects priming treatments: 145 
 146 
1) Religion (primes: divine, holy, pious, religious) 147 
2) Punishment (primes: revenge, punish, penalty, retribution) 148 
3) Religion-Punishment (primes: divine, revenge, pious, punish) 149 
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9 
4) Control (primes: northeast, acoustic, tractor, carton)2 150 
 151 
The priming episode comprised 20 priming trials. The sequence of events for each trial 152 
was as follows (see Figure 1): fixation point for 500ms, forward mask for 500ms, prime 153 
for 40ms then backward mask for 500ms. As soon as the priming episode concluded the 154 
second stage of the punishment game began, and once this stage was complete 155 
participants underwent a systematic test for prime visibility. We excluded any 156 
participants who performed significantly above chance on this test. 157 
 158 
 159 
______________________________ 160 
Insert Figure 1 about here 161 
______________________________ 162 
 163 
 164 
Religion Questionnaire 165 
In addition to requesting religious affiliation, our religion questionnaire included a 166 
series of items answered on a five-point Likert scale (1=Strongly Disagree; 5=Strongly 167 
Agree; see Table 1 for a list of these items) followed by a single YES/NO item: “In the 168 
past year, did you donate to a religious organization?” 169 
                                                 
2 Primes were presented in German; these are English translations. See Table S1 in the supplementary 
material available online for the German words actually presented. 
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10 
 170 
 171 
______________________________ 172 
Insert Table 1 about here 173 
______________________________ 174 
 175 
 176 
Results 177 
 178 
We ran separate analyses for two dependent variables: 179 
 180 
1. Punishment of the unfair choice (590,60); See Table 2. 181 
2. Punishment of the fair choice (150,150); See Table 3. 182 
 183 
In each case we analysed the actual strength (amount) of punishment rather than simply 184 
whether punishment occurred or not at any strength. 185 
 186 
 187 
______________________________ 188 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 189 
______________________________ 190 
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 191 
 192 
There were no significant main effects of our experimental primes on punishment of the 193 
unfair (Table 2, Model 1) or fair (Table 3, Model 1) choices, although the effect of 194 
Punishment primes was marginally significant (and positive) for punishment of the 195 
unfair choice (see coefficient for ‘Punishment Prime’ in Table 2, Model 1). For 196 
punishment of the unfair choice, however, there was a highly significant interaction 197 
between religious donations and the Religion priming treatment (see coefficient for 198 
‘Religious Donations x Rel’ in Table 2, Model 2). Neither religious donations nor 199 
religious priming had effects in isolation (see respective coefficients for ‘Religious 200 
Donations’ and ‘Religion Prime’ in Table 2, Model 2), but when both were present they 201 
jointly increased punishment of the unfair choice by .84 of a standard deviation, p = 202 
0.0013. Apart from a significant main effect of gender for punishment of the unfair 203 
choice (see coefficient for ‘Female’ in Table 2, Model 2: in line with previous research, 204 
females were less punitive; [see, e.g., 27]), no other effects were significant for either 205 
type of punishment. 206 
 207 
Discussion 208 
 209 
Humans are subject to strong cultural norms of fairness. A substantial proportion of 210 
                                                 
3 Note that the coefficients in our models are in natural units. When we re-analyse with normalized 
continuous variables the coefficient for ‘Religious Donations x Rel’ is .84. 
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12 
participants in anonymous, one-shot economic games nominate fair outcomes even 211 
when such outcomes are to their material disadvantage [10,12]. Humans, moreover, 212 
incur costs to reward others who behave fairly and to impose sanctions on those who 213 
behave unfairly [11]. Recent studies indicate that priming participants with religious 214 
concepts promotes prosocial behaviour [e.g., 17,19]. Our aim in the present experiment 215 
was to investigate whether religious priming would also promote the costly punishment 216 
of unfair behaviour. 217 
 218 
Across all participants, our results indicate a negative answer to this question: There 219 
was no main effect of religious primes, whether alone or in combination with 220 
punishment primes, on punishment behaviour. The only suggestion of a main effect for 221 
priming treatment was for punishment primes alone, which (perhaps unsurprisingly) 222 
tended to increase punishment of unfair choices. However, religious primes did strongly 223 
increase the costly punishment of unfair behaviour for a subset of our participants – 224 
those who had previously donated to a religious organization.  225 
 226 
How are we to account for these results? In line with Shariff and Norenzayan [17], we 227 
consider two possible explanations. The first is that religious primes activate the notion 228 
that one’s behaviour is observed by a supernatural agent. In this case primed 229 
participants punish unfair behaviours because they sense that not doing so will damage 230 
their standing in the eyes of a supernatural agent. Recent studies suggest that even very 231 
subtle cues that one is being watched, such as stylized eyespots on a computer screen, 232 
Page 12 of 27
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/prsb
Submitted to Proceedings of the Royal Society B
For Review Only
 
 
 
13 
can affect giving behaviour [e.g., 28-29; cf. 30]. Some authors have suggested that such 233 
cues match the input conditions for evolved mental mechanisms that detect when one’s 234 
behaviour is observed [28]. Religious primes might likewise function as input for these 235 
mechanisms [17]. 236 
 237 
The second possibility is a behavioural priming explanation, whereby religious primes 238 
activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion 239 
behaviour consistent with those norms. This explanation is consistent with evidence 240 
that the activation of conceptual representations increases the likelihood of behaviours 241 
consistent with those representations [e.g., 31]. Thus, much as participants walk more 242 
slowly down a length of corridor when the concept “elderly” is primed [31], priming 243 
words that are semantically associated with fairness may lead participants to punish 244 
unfair behaviours simply by virtue of that semantic connection [22]. Bargh et al. [32] 245 
found that participants primed with cooperation-related words (e.g., fair, share) were 246 
less selfish in a subsequent resource-management game, and Shariff and Norenzayan 247 
[17] found that priming with secular-moral words (e.g., court, contract) had a similar 248 
effect to that of religious primes on fair allocations in a subsequent dictator game. 249 
 250 
Although they acknowledge that the two mechanisms above need not be mutually 251 
exclusive, Shariff and Norenzayan [17] favour the ‘supernatural watcher’ account (cf. 252 
22). Norenzayan et al. [33] argue that behavioural priming effects are “typically 253 
impervious to prior explicit beliefs or attitudes” (p. 532). If this is true, then one would 254 
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14 
not expect the effects of religious primes to be mediated by individual religiosity if those 255 
effects are attributable to behavioural priming. Norenzayan et al. [33] also describe a 256 
recent series of studies which found that religious primes caused an increase in public 257 
self-awareness, which is “characterized by attentiveness to those features of one’s self 258 
that are presented to others” [34, p. 366] and so directly linked to sensitivity about being 259 
observed. 260 
 261 
Regarding the former point, it seems to us that the effect of activating a certain set of 262 
cultural norms might well be stronger for those who have internalized those norms. 263 
With respect to our experiment, it seems plausible that the behavioural norms of 264 
religious institutions are more strongly represented in the minds of individuals who 265 
financially support those institutions, and thus more susceptible to activation by 266 
relevant primes. Nevertheless, we agree with Norenzayan et al. [33] that multiple 267 
psychological mechanisms may be operative and even mutually reinforcing. If an 268 
individual believes that in order to avoid punishment herself she needs both to adhere 269 
to and to uphold cultural norms of fairness, then religious primes may affect 270 
punishment behaviours both by evoking a sense of being observed and by directly 271 
activating the relevant norms. Future work might profitably investigate these 272 
possibilities. 273 
 274 
The accounts we have considered above pertain to proximate explanation. In terms of 275 
ultimate evolutionary explanation, our results are consistent with dual inheritance 276 
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15 
proposals about religion and cooperation.4 A number of authors [e.g., 36-39] have 277 
suggested that the human proclivity for acquiring and transmitting supernatural agent 278 
concepts is an incidental byproduct of cognitive mechanisms genetically adapted for 279 
other purposes. Others [e.g., 33,40-43] have argued that religions are cultural systems 280 
that exploit such byproducts to adaptive effect. If, as our results indicate, the activation 281 
of supernatural agent concepts promotes the enforcement of cultural norms of fairness, 282 
and if such norms sustain cooperative behaviours within the group, then religions that 283 
harness such concepts will enhance the survival prospects of their vectors, thereby 284 
contributing to their own survival. 285 
                                                 
4
 Recently, Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan [35] documented evidence that university students, 
particularly in Western societies, are frequent outliers on many psychological measures. Given that most 
of our participants were university students in Zürich, a note of caution about the generalisabity of our 
findings is in order. 
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Figure 1: Sequence of events on each priming trial 391 
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Table 1 
Likert Items from Religion Questionnaire 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.   I often think about God 
2.   I often attend religious services (apart from weddings, funerals & christenings) 
3.   I often pray outside of religious services 
4.   I often read or study religious texts outside of religious services 
5.   I believe in God 
6.   I believe in life after death 
7.   I believe God knows everything we do or think 
8.   I believe in heaven 
9.   I believe in hell 
10. I believe God will punish sinners 
11. I believe God will reward believers 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 
Models 1 and 2 for punishment of the unfair choice. Predictor variables include age and a 
dummy variable denoting female gender; a composite of the 11 Likert items from the religion 
questionnaire, representing the average of responses to these items; a dummy variable for 
religious donations; and dummies for the three experimental priming treatments. Each of the 
priming treatment dummy variables is also interacted with the Likert composite and with the 
religious donations dummy. An asterisk indicates significance at the 0.05 level, and two asterisks 
indicate significance at the 0.01 level. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 1   Model 2 
          ______________________    ______________________ 
Variable             Estimate     SE       p value        Estimate    SE     p value 
______________________________________________________________________________   
Intercept              6.966      1.966    < 0.001 **          12.017    7.663   0.118 
Age     ____              0.078     0.261   0.766 
Female                                          ____          -5.248    2.023   0.010 *  
Likert Composite   ____          -1.093    2.112   0.605 
Religious Donations                        ____          -7.054    5.264   0.182 
Religion Prime             -0.170      2.844       0.952       -4.192    7.251   0.564 
Punishment Prime    5.275     2.793       0.060       -5.508    6.808   0.419 
Religion-Punishment Prime 1.960     2.844       0.492       -5.051    7.367   0.494 
Likert Composite x Rel    ____            0.131   3.102   0.966 
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Likert Composite x Pun       ____                    3.942   2.784   0.158 
Likert Composite x Rel-Pun   ____              2.566   2.993   0.392 
Religious Donations x Rel   ____          29.394   8.929   0.001 ** 
Religious Donations x Pun     ____             3.377   7.587   0.657 
Religious Donations x Rel-Pun  ____              0.691   7.509   0.927  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 
Models 1 and 2 for punishment of the fair choice. Predictor variables are as per Table 2. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Model 1   Model 2 
          ______________________    ______________________ 
Variable             Estimate     SE       p value        Estimate    SE     p value 
______________________________________________________________________________   
Intercept              1.610     1.314       0.222        2.515     5.278   0.634 
Age     ____             -0.094     0.180   0.600 
Female                                          ____          2.309      1.393   0.099 
Likert Composite   ____          0.153      1.454   0.917 
Religious Donations                        ____         -1.643      3.625   0.651 
Religion Prime                   0.760   1.901       0.690            -6.059      4.993   0.226 
Punishment Prime    3.079     1.867       0.100      -0.948      4.689   0.840 
Religion-Punishment Prime 2.131     1.901       0.264       3.129      5.073   0.538 
Likert Composite x Rel    ____          3.020      2.137   0.159 
Likert Composite x Pun       ____                  1.489      1.917   0.438 
Likert Composite x Rel-Pun   ____           -0.165      2.061   0.936 
Religious Donations x Rel   ____         -0.391      6.149   0.949 
Religious Donations x Pun     ____           2.031      5.225   0.698 
Religious Donations x Rel-Pun  ____           -2.190      5.171   0.672 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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